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Middle Eastern politics. The upshot was 
not peace and stability but endless spar-
ring with Saddam Hussein, along with 
the bombing of Khobar Towers, the at-
tack on the U.S.S. Cole, and, if indirectly, 
the horrific events of September 11. 
The other major military actions of the 
90's—the air campaigns in Bosnia and Ko-
sovo, each hailed at the time as a dramat-
ic demonstration of high-tech military 
power used to advance an humanitarian 
agenda—produced similarly ambiguous 
results. To be sure, armed intervention— 
chiefly in the form of American airpow-
er—halted Balkan "ethnic cleansing." 
Preventing its resumption, however, re-
quires the United States and her allies to 
maintain a permanent and decidedly 
low-tech military presence in the region. 
The animosities and ambitions that fu-
eled ethnic unrest remain stubbornly in 
place. 
Now, the 43rd president has set out to 
correct the (still unacknowledged) errors 
of the 41st, making an end to Saddam 
Hussein once and for all. The White 
House justifies this portentous step as 
necessary to eliminate the threat of a hos-
tile Iraq armed with weapons of mass de-
stiuction. But the administration's plans 
do not end there. Even before making it to 
Baghdad, President Bush and his hawk-
ish advisors were looking beyond it. In 
their eyes, toppling Saddam Hussein con-
stitutes only the first step in a vastly more 
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THE SCRIPT" 
"Information Minister, Sheikh 
Rasheed Ahmed has said that Pak-
istan has enough grounds for pre-
emptive strike against India. 
"He said this while addressing 
a large public gathering here on 
Monday. 'India is producing 
weapons of mass destruction and 
stocking these weapons in a neigh-
bouring country,' he said adding 
that India was also involved in 
the massacre of innocent people 
in Gujrat and Indian held Kash-
mir." 
—from "Pak Has Enough 
Grounds For Pre-Emptive 
Strike Against India," 
Pakistani News Service (April 8) 
ambitious enterprise to be underwritten 
by American military prowess. 
After removing Saddam from power, 
U.S. forces will occupy Baghdad and—if 
we are to believe claims coming from the 
White House—convert Iraq into a model 
of democracy. The United States will 
work in defeated Iraq the same magic 
that she worked in defeated Germany 
and Japan—an expectation that ignores a 
mountain of cultural, ethnic, and reli-
gious obstacles to which America's high-
tech military will prove irrelevant. 
For the Bush administration, however, 
even success on this front will be the be-
ginning, not the end. "Fixing" Iraq con-
stitutes only phase one in a plan that aims 
to "fix" the region as a whole. 
Slipping the steel fist of militar)' power 
back into the velvet glove of American 
statecraft, President Bush and his lieu-
tenants will turn next to their ambitious 
vision for reordering the Middle East ac-
cording to their liking. Hitherto recalci-
trant Arab potentates, having witnessed 
yet another demonstration of U.S. mili-
tar)' supremacy, will (presumably) fall in-
to line. Islam will be cured of its radical 
inclinations. Among the ricket}' nations 
of the Arab world, modernit)' will take 
hold. Peace, democracy, and liberal val-
ues will prevail —all made possible by 
America's unquestioned militar)' preemi-
nence. For the ideologues of the Bush 
administration, liberal democracy is like 
a light bulb. You just insert into any 
available socket, and it works. The U.S. 
militar)' is the hand that turns the bulb. 
This, of course, is the stuff of fantasy 
rather than statecraft, rooted in an infatu-
ation with military power and a corre-
sponding naivete about political realities. 
It is a vision of almost breathtaking eth-
nocentiism, based on the belief that there 
is no problem that cannot be solved if on-
ly others will simply become like us. Cer-
tainly, it represents the very inverse of the 
humility that Ceorge W. Bush once prom-
ised would govem his thinking about Amer-
ica's relations to the rest of the world. 
Above all, the Bush game plan for the 
Middle East is a recipe not for peace and 
stability but for endless meddling and 
perpetual war—and the inevitable dissi-
pation of the military might in which we 
take such pride. 
In another day, Americans would have 
rejected such fantasies out of hand. It 
was a battle-hardened G.I. in Norman 
Mailer's 1948 novel The Naked and the 
Dead who observed that "Fighting a war 
to fix something works about as good as 
going to a whorehouse to get rid of a clap." 
Those who today inhabit the precincts of 
power in Washington have long since 
lost sight of that commonsensical fact. 
Alas, so, too, have many ordinary citi-
zens, captivated by the allure of revolu-
tionary new military capabilities. 
As a great power, the United States re-
quires military strength and will, from 
time to time, find herself obliged to use 
force. But force—no matter how gener-
ously festooned with the latest ornaments 
of information-age technology—is not a 
panacea. What remains to be seen is 
how large a catastrophe must occur be-
fore Americans reawaken to that truth. 
Andrew J. Bacevich teaches international 
relations at Boston University and is the 
author of American Empire: The 
Realities and Consequences of U.S. 
Diplomacy (2002). 
Caveat Preemptor 
by Edward A. Oken 
All prudent consumers are supposed to be guided by the waming embodied 
in the ancient Latin expression Caveat 
emptor ("Let the buyer beware"). A con-
temporary geopolitical modification of 
that expression should be borne in mind 
by Americans as the United States more 
vigorously embraces the legitimacy of 
preemptive military attacks against adver-
saries who may attack the United States— 
namely. Caveat preemptor. 
U.S. national security strategy has al-
ways embodied a blend of defensive and 
offensive capabilities, following the wis-
dom that "the best defense is a good of-
fense." In this context, the decision of 
the Bush administration after September 
11 to engage in some preemptive attacks 
is in keeping with that tradition. 
An emphasis on preemption is akin to 
periodic reminders by administration of-
ficials that the United States may exercise 
the option of using nuclear weapons. 
Most recentiy, this approach has been ev-
ident in hints that the United States might 
use all available weapons against adver-
saries who might be tempted to use their 
"weapons of mass destruction" against 
the United States. The risk inherent in 
this approach is that—like nuclear esca-
lation during the Cold War—use of a 
preemptive option could get out of con-




call our bluff. 
The concept of preemption affirmed 
by President Bush in his June 2002 speech 
at West Point and in his subsequent Na-
tional Security Strategy is different, how-
ever, because it more openly stresses the 
United States' prerogative to undertake 
preemptive military actions against per-
ceived threats while backing way from 
our established reliance on strategic de-
terrence. Clearly, this is a significant shift 
in U.S. security priorities. 
What is to prevent other countries from 
following the United States' example in 
waging preemptive wars against perceived 
threats? Were U.S. allies to emulate this 
principle, what would prevent one of 
them from launching a unilateral pre-
emptive militar)'strike of her own? Would 
such an action obligate the United States 
to stand by her ally? If the answer is yes, 
then we had better reappraise the nature 
of U.S. alliances and how their geopoliti-
cal contexts could entangle us in wars 
that are not of our choosing. If the an-
swer is no, then why should those allies 
be expected to stand by the United States 
in the context of any preemptive Ameri-
can attack against a perceived enemy? 
In either case, it is in the national in-
terest of the United States and disparate 
friends and allies to clarify in advance 
each side's obligations. Such clarifica-
tions should be spelled out in all the se-
curity treaties and executive agreements 
that form the basis of our strategic ties 
worldwide. We could forge agreements 
with our allies to guarantee advanced 
consultation before any security partner 
would take preemptive military action. 
Or we could secure the sole prerogative 
to take preemptive military actions — 
without obligating our friends and allies 
to support them. Or any ally could pur-
sue military preemptive action on her 
own initiative, on the understanding that 
there would be no obligation for the oth-
er security partners to support it. 
Dealing with existing or potential ad-
versaries is far more daunting. What is to 
stop our adversaries from copying the 
United States in a hostile manner? If 
such countries—especially members of 
the "Axis of Evil"—are confident that the 
United States is fully prepared and will-
ing to launch a preemptive war on one or 
more of them, why would they avoid con-
templating what could be labeled "pre-
emptive preemption?" 
North Korea's reaction to the Bush 
Doctrine was far more ominous than Sad-
dam Hussein's. In several respects. North 
Korea is a much more formidable adver-
sary than Iraq. With North Korea's enor-
mous military establishment equipped 
with an array of offensive weapons and 
noted for its fanaticism, no one visualizes 
regime change in Pyongyang as a low-risk 
endeavor. Although her economy is a 
mess, North Korea's military does not 
share the liabilities more evident in Iraq's 
military. Moreover, North Korea has a 
track record of engaging in a provocative 
strategy that seeks to push the United 
States to the cusp of war. Thus, when the 
Bush administration adopted a tougher 
policy toward North Korea, labeled her 
part of the Axis of Evil, and implied that 
she might warrant preemptive military 
tieatment, the North Koreans launched a 
new round of nuclear brinkmanship. In 
effect, Pyongyang has tried to up the ante 
vis-a-vis the United States, by taking ad-
vantage of the geopolitical strains inher-
ent in a multiple-war scenario for U.S. 
strategists and adopting the Bush Doc-
trine for its own purposes. As North Ko-
rean Foreign Ministry Deputy Director Ri 
Pyong-gap observed, "The United States 
says that after Iraq, we are next, but we 
have our own countermeasures. Preemp-
tive attacks are not the exclusive right of 
the U.S." (quoted in Jonathan Watts, "N. 
Korea Threatens US With First Strike," 
the Guardian, February 6, 2003). The 
plausibility of such threats is open to de-
bate, but there is no question that North 
Korea seems to be willing to experiment 
with the option of preemptive preemp-
tion. 
It does not take much imagination to 
visualize; the risks this convoluted psycho-
logy could unleash. Instead of preventing 
war scenarios —as mutual deterrence is 
intended to do—mutual preemptive strate-
gies could escalate the prospects for armed 
conflicts. The United States may be able 
to utilize effectively a preemptive strike 
against the first perceived adversary she 
chooses to deal with, but all the others 
waiting in the wings would henceforth 
possess major incentives to try to preempt 
the U.S. preemptor. North Korea seems 
to be at the head of the line of states will-
ing to follow through on those incentives. 
However, it is important to note that— 
for all her sinister qualities—North Korea 
remains a territorial state with attendant 
geopolitical vulnerabilities. Moreover, 
both North and South Korea share ambi-
tions to reunify their nation into a single 
state. Therefore, there may be far greater 
dangers posed by an array of violentiy rad-
ical nonstate actors who do not have much 
to lose. When dealing with terrorists or 
their supporters, there are few deterrents 
for the United States to use other than 
threats of preemptive strikes designed to 
destroy their organizational infrastruc-
ture and transnational support network. 
Unfortunately, unlike during the Cold 
War, there is little to inhibit today's ter-
rorist adversaries from turning the tables 
on the United States. These terrorists 
perceive their brand of preemption as 
more effective than anything the United 
States can inflict on them. Preemptive 
armed attacks on the United States or her 
interests abroad can be psychologically 
effective in exerting pressure on Ameri-
can society to get the U.S. government to 
alter its policies. Consequentiy, these dy-
namics pose great risks, as the United 
States and nonstate terrorist groups try to 
outmaneuver one another. 
Before the United States goes too far 
down the path to strategic preemption, 
Americans had better contemplate what 
it may be like if we find ourselves either 
caught up in, or on the receiving end of, 
other countties' or terrorist groups' emu-
lation of the Bush Doctrine. Our adver-
saries have ample reason to consider pre-
emptive preemption. This does not mean 
that we should forego preemption as a 
last resort, but it does mean that the Unit-
ed States should not shay too far from her 
established strategic principles of deter-
rence. The primary forms of U.S. pre-
emption should remain diplomatic and 
economic. Excessive emphasis —real 
or rhetorical —on military preemption 
would not necessarily enhance U.S. na-
tional security and could expose the Unit-
ed States to being entangled in perpetual 
war. Furthermore, the emphasis on pre-
emption as a key part of U.S. strategic 
policy unwisely suggests a hegemonic 
empire bent on overturning challenges 
to far-flung outposts. It is far sounder for 
the United States to focus on a stiategic 
policy appropriate for a republic defend-
ing itself against threats to its territorial 
security. Given these parameters. Caveat 
preemptor, indeed. 
Edward A. Olsen is Professor of National 
Security Affairs at the Naval Postgradu-
ate School in Monterey, California, and 
the author ofU.S. National Defense for 
the Twenty-First Century: The Grand 
Exit Strategy (Frank Cass) and Toward 
Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: In 
Due Course? (Lynne Rienner). The 
views expressed are personal and do not 




In the Dark 
by George McCartney 
Justice Blinded 
Ron Shelton's Dark Blue opens with the 
infamous video of Rodney King taking a 
beating at the hands of four Los Angeles 
policemen on March 3, 1991. It closes a 
year later with the race riot that ensued 
after an all-white jury in Simi Valley ex-
onerated the cops. This exercise of stren-
uous civil disobedience left 54 dead, 2,500 
injured, and a billion dollars lost to theft 
and property damage. You would think a 
narrative unfolding between these events 
would display some respect for things as 
they were. This, unfortunately, is not the 
case. Dark Blue boasts some exceptional 
performers, especially Kurt Russell and 
Brendan Gleeson, but the script lets them 
down badly. Shelton gives us another 
corrupt-cop/innocent-cop melodrama, 
the kind you can see nightly on televi-
sion. He and his writers, James Ellroy 
and David Ayer, even include the phony 
moral uplift TV hacks invariably epoxy 
onto their denouements. There are, nev-
ertheless, traces of a good movie in this 
cinematic wreck, albeit buried under a 
paddywagonful of cliches. 
Still, ft is a delight to see Russell and 
Gleeson working together. As the bluff, 
no-nonsense police captain, improbably 
named Jack Van Meter, Gleeson makes 
the most of his brief appearances. The 
Irish actor is utterly convincing as a hard-
ened administrator whose constant smile 
masks a heart stonier than Barbra Strei-
sand's at a Republican ftmdraiser. Russell, 
as always, inhabits his role with exquisite 
nonchalance. Like Gene Hackman, he 
is a "star" who refreshingly plays his part, 
not himself As Eldon Perry, he is a spe-
cial-investigations detective so thorough-
ly submerged in the corrupt cop culture 
of South Central Los Angeles that he's 
nearly oblivious to the harm he is doing. 
Still, he is not wholly without conscience. 
After he needlessly kills a career criminal, 
he sends some money to the creep's wid-
ow and son on Christmas. What more 
can anyone ask? From Shelton's per-
spective, Perry is the diseased part that 
stands for the unwholesome whole. 
We first meet Perry as he guides his 
rookie partner, Bobby Keough (Scott 
Speedman), through an official inquiry. 
The police review board wants the young 
man to justify killing a suspect he was 
pursuing. Having been coached by the 
master, Bobby clears himself Later, we 
learn the shooting was almost certainly 
not necessary. But this does not trouble 
Perry and Van Meter. Instead, they cele-
brate their young colleague's successful 
deception by breaking out the whiskey, 
which is never far from their reach. (They 
would happily pour four fingers on a re-
port of smog over L.A.) 
Since profiling is one of the abuses 
Shelton attacks, he might want to look to 
himself Although Van Meter and Perry 
are not classically Irish names, Gleeson, 
by force of brogue, and Russell, by sheer 
thespian blarney, play their characters as 
if they both have living roots in the ould 
sod. Shelton seems to think it follows, as 
Paddy does Bridget, that they must be 
wedded to the bottle. 
Perry and Van Meter are badged hoo-
ligans for whom the worst kind of human 
behavior is an endless source of hilarity. 
Having long ago concluded that the world 
is a festering pus hole, they get a charge 
from hitting the streets and pushing the 
crud around, laughing all the while at the 
stupidity and wickedness they encounter— 
drug dealing, drug abuse, pimping, rape, 
robberies, gunplay, etc. Waxing philosoph-
ical for a moment. Van Meter explains 
that "I am charged with performing un-
pleasant tasks so others can perform pleas-
ant ones" and goes on to observe, "We're 
working in a gassy s--t dome." When 
Bobby recoils at such talk, Perr)' puts him 
right. Van Meter, he reminds his callow 
colleague, is old school, and he deserves 
their unstinting loyalty. He's one of those 
cops. Perry continues, nearly choking 
with sincerity, who "built this city with 
bullets." His sincerity, however, is com-
promised by the way Russell delivers this 
line. He gives it an all-too-practiced air. 
You sense that he has used such formulas 
often to salve his shrinking conscience. 
Russell's Perr)' is otherwise too hotwired 
with booze and adrenaline to look be-
yond the bromide. He cannot wait to 
corner his next perp and blast his eyes 
with mace or shove a 9 mm. into his neck. 
He fairly giggles at the prospect. Without 
lowlifes to bat around, he would not know 
what to do with his energy. Russell re-
minds me of Hackman in The French 
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and James Ellroy 
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by Mark Steven Johnson 
Connection (1971) or Denzel Washington 
in Training Day (2001). Like their per-
formances, Russell's crackles with an en-
ergy so irrepressible it's hypnotic. How 
can someone so vile be so compelling? 
Shelton does not seem to have a clue, 
which is unfortunate: This should have 
been one of his major points of explo-
ration. 
Shelton wants us to believe that Perry's 
brand of policing is endemic and that it is 
responsible for the smoldering resent-
ment in the underclass. How could such 
treatment not lead to crime and rioting 
among those on the receiving end? But 
this is a chicken-and-egg argument. Does 
Perry's craziness engender the sulfurous 
conditions of ghetto life, or does the ghet-
to create Perr}'? Growing up in Brooklyn, 
I knew several young men who joined 
the police force. After a few years—often 
only a few months—they began to exhib-
it some of Perry's milder traits. Their 
beats invariably included low-rent neigh-
borhoods, since Brooklyn's social classes 
are rarely separated by more than a few 
blocks. They would come home full of 
stories about the depths to which human 
beings could descend —junkies dying in 
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